Llama: update history

src/content/llama/a-history-of-llamas.md

@@ -189,3 +189,5 @@ how much impact they have in a retrospective:
  - **2024-03-27**: DataBricks open sources DBRX, a 132B parameter MoE with 36B
    parameters active per forward pass. It was trained on 12T tokens. According
    to user evaluation, it beats Mixtral for all uses.
+ - **2024-04-18**: Meta releases LLaMA3 8b and 70b. 70b is the new best open
+   model, right around Claude3 Sonnet and above older gpt4 versions!

src/content/unix/unix-password-management.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ updateDate: 'March 28 2024'
 
 Passwords are often the main method of digital identification. This means
 anything you don't want others to access but do want yourself to access is
-behind some sort of password. This means we need to optimize on two fronts:
+behind some sort of password. We need to optimize on two fronts:
 
  - Easy of access: Passwords must be quick and easy to access and use
  - High security: Passwords must be strong to resist attacks
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ the way we'll learn a lot about password security in general!
 
 ## Optimizing for high-security
 
-A password is pretty pointless if it's not strong enough to be cracked. Let's
-look over some core security concepts!
+A password is pretty pointless if it's not strong enough to not get cracked.
+Let's look over some core security concepts!
 
 ### Measuring Bits of Entropy
 
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ result of the output space being lower dimensional than any password with higher
 entropy, so any "stronger" password would be projected down to only 256 bits of
 entropy.
 
-We can also look at how fast computers can brute-force passwords.
+We can also look at how quickly computers can brute-force passwords.
 [Bcrypt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bcrypt) is one of the most popular
 hashing choices for passwords. Assuming a company is decently secure, they use
 enough rounds of hashing such that a modern processor takes about 100ms to hash
@@ -348,11 +348,10 @@ example, if a phone camera records you typing on your keyboard to decrypt the
 GPG key, the attacker can't do *anything* with that password alone. They still
 need physical access to your system to grab the files themselves.
 
-An odd benefit of 3-factor authentication is distributing backups. If you
-provide people who know you, but mutually don't know one another, you can safely
-entrust your passwords with third parties. This is since they need all 3 pieces
-to mount an attack, so giving a trusted third party only 1 piece doesn't
-compromise your security.
+An odd benefit of 3-factor authentication is distributing backups. You can
+distribute the 3 pieces between 3 third parties you trust. So long as they don't
+know each other, having 1/3 pieces doesn't compromise your security, especially
+if you trust them.
 
 Malware *could* be both a key logger and grab the files from
 `~/.password-store`, but that is some very sophisticated and targeted